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l.

APOLOGY

I am a sick man; I am a spiteful man. I am an unpleasant man. 1 You can deal
with me, however, because I am your creature. And with Ishmael taken, 2 I
(through you) have called me Daniel.3 Unlike my namesake, the interpreter of
dreams at around the time of Nebuchadnezzar,4 I have become a poor poet. 5
Like my namesake, the fictional stand-in for the Rosenberg sons,6 I am an
orphan, willed to become so by baleful authorities such as yourself. You have
authored me into this underground status by disconnecting me from what I was.
In return, or so you tell me, you have offered me "excellence in mediocrity."7
Well, thanks a helluva lot! From the cellarage beneath your complaints, Daniel

* With a nod to Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground, in NO'I'ES FROM UNDERGROUND &
THE GRAND INQUISITOR 3-118 (Ralph Matlaw trans., E.P. Dutton 1960) (1864), and as adumbrated in
these pages with the help of Richard H. Weisberg.
** Floersheimer Professor of Constitutional Law, Cardozo Law School of Yeshiva University. ©
2009, Richard H. Weisberg. I wish to thank Professor Robin West for her very helpful suggestions
during the revisions of this Response. I also wish to express my friendship for and indebtedness to
Professor Pierre Schlag, whose words gave life to what follows here.
1. Dostoevsky, supra note*, at 3.
2. See HERMAN MELVILLE, MoBY D1cK (1850).
3. Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A
Repon on the State of the Art), 97 GEo. L.J. 803,813 n.30 (2009).
4. Daniel 2: 1.
·
5. See Schlag, supra note 3, at 813 n.31; infra Part II.
6. See Sam Roberts, Figure in Rosenberg Case Admits to Soviet Spying, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 2008,
at A 1. See generally E.L. DocroRow, THE BooK OF DANIEL ( 1970). Daniel is the youthful protagonist of
this story, which is a fictional recreation of the still controversial Rosenberg espionage case of the
McCarthy period; when his parents are both found guilty and executed, Daniel becomes an orphan.
7. Schlag, supra note 3, Part I and passim.
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talces his revenge. 8 You having squelched his genius, what is left of yours will
be stifled by his resentment. In a few years time, the Court behind him, Daniel
will pick up where you left off, severing the young from the best they were
while at the same time airing crazy tunes heard only by the deaf.
No sea story here, you have given me instead a "see-story." Like his Biblical
namesake, Daniel will finally SEE. SEE what a mistake it was to choose this
mediocre discourse as my lifework! SEE that the seemingly "real and consequential"9 is in fact "sound and fury." 10 SEE how my law professors bait and trap!
SEE how they avoid everything that signifies-even if merely on the level of
intellectual rigor 11-while promising that we will be THE BEST AND THE
BRIGHTEST. 12 SEE how their mediocre work product has spread underground,
its weeds rankly corrupting those who must edit it or listen to the classroom
variation of the same rot.
Daniel did not want to miss the big kahuna. Herewith the spiteful account of
the ways you drove Daniel from the sun-splashed surface to the indeterminate
depths.
IL

SEE DANIEL AS A POOR POET

But perhaps you glean only my resentment. You don't understand how much
I admire you, count on you, set you up as a model for my future actions and
thoughts. From my underground, sub-textual camp, I have read you evoke the
days of glory. Like the creature in Kafka's burrow, 13 I scurry subterraneously,
longing for those days of yore. You tell me they are gone forever, yet my own
work for you sent me on dizzying voyages to Holmes and Llewellyn, 14 Robert
Cover, 15 and-not once but twice-James Boyd White.16 Why are these people
lost to you? And thus to me? You mention Samuel Beckett, your only specifically literary reference; 17 like his characters, you wait for something. 18 No: you
want something, in every sense, and I love you for that desire and for that
concurrent lack.
But the Godot you await and the thing that you want are already inside you.
So why have you kept them there, even in your ramblings about the lost wave

8. See id. at 813 n.30.
9. Id. at 835.
10. WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE SOUND AND TIIE FURY (1929); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH (1606).
11. Schlag, supra note 3, at 810 n.21.
12. Id. at 830 n.61.
13. FRANZ KAFKA, The Burrow, in THE COMPLETE STORIES 325-60 (Nahum N. Glatzer ed., Schocken
Books 1976).
14. Schlag, supra note 3, at 805 n.7.
15. Id. at 817 n.38.
16. Id. at 813 n.30, 825 n.48.
17. Id. at 826 n.51. You also mention the great "past" of Law and Literature and the other subgenres
of the "law and . . ." movement.See id. at Part III.
18. Id. at 826 & n.51.
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and the "swamper"? 19 By repressing them even now, you have willfully robbed
me of the poetic within me and consequentially of the poetic within the subject
you teach and write. Your nostalgia substitutes lost glories for present possibilities, and those who must reckon with your sentimentality lack the power you
have to regain the moments only you can recall, the liquefied majesty of the
ocean wave and the grand rapids.
On my first day of law school, I realized that you and your colleagues .
primarily had in mind a training that would stifle the poetic within your
students. Whatever you were writing about it for your peers in ·those halcyon
1980s, law for your groundlings had to be the narrow and unimaginative logic
that had been there for a century or more 20 but whose only justification was its
longevity. Or maybe also its place in procuring for you thrice the salary of those
teaching English Lit. across the midway.2 1
The lack of pedagogical imagination that locked Langdell in place for
thirteen decades or so, while all about him was moving on, cost me and my
classmates dearly. Did you read the doggerel they let me add underneath one of
your absurd ruminations? "Mist-filled gardens across the sky./Jurisprudence in
my teeth/Where does New York?" 22 I can almost hear the Biblical Daniel
grieving for his twenty-first century namesake: "How hath he strayed from the
beautiful verses of his college years!" It's law-school, my prophetic friend,
law-school, with its "mist-filled" logic, its "in my teeth" sophistry, its deliberate
severing of the student from "New York" and everything varied, zesty, eloquent,
and humane.
But you, you, you were our shepherd, our best hope, our Jeremiah. You blame
the fates and I guess your colleagues for your sad conclusion: "[N]othing's
happening. " 23 Like Justice Brennan losing control over the progeny of New
York Tzmes v. Sullivan, 24 however, you must take responsibility for this falling
off. I was in swaddling clothes, ready to mature into a poetic (or should I say
"poethic"25 ) lawyer while you were abandoning the front to your more conventional, more cautious colleagues. Woe unto me and my impoverished words!
Woe unto the profession you have bequeathed to me!

19. Id. at 831 & n.63.
20. Id. at 822 n.45.
21. I take this to be -Judge Posner's main analytical caution to those law professors he fears may
become overly enthused about Law and Literature. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATIJRE (2d ed. 1998).
22. Schlag, supra note 3, at 813 n.31.
23. Id. at 805.
24. I refer to the terrible failing off from the spirit of N. Y. Times Co: v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 ( 1964),
in such cases as Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and Millwvitch v. Lorraine Daily
Newspapers, 491 U.S. 1 (1990), both of which came down on Brennan's watch. See Richard Weisberg,
Monica's Starrs and Stripes, 12 CARDOZO STIJD. L. & LITERATIJRE iii, viii-x (2000).
25. RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POE1"HICS: AND On!ER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATIJRE (1992).
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SEE DANIEL AS A NARROWMAN

Maybe I am being too harsh. You are a good person. THE LAST OF THE
JUST? 6 My resentment blinds me to your accuracy and good faith and makes
me lump you together with those you criticize. Your complaint has merit: your
colleagues have reverted to a scholarly mode that guarantees its own mediocrity. You expected more of them. Spitefully, I have made you responsible for
what they see as the simple healing of a fissure you oriefly imposed on them
twenty years ago. Your scholarship split from your own humdrum pedagogy.
You divided the field (and yourself) by creating a law-review discourse that was
challenging, or in your words (decidedly not mine27 ): "something intellectually
edifying, politically admirable, or aesthetically enlivening." 28 Your schizophrenia presented itself almost each time you · stood before a law school class
because you failed to map your scholarly excellence onto the Langdellian
curricular duties your dean imposed on you. The first-year courses stayed right
where the Great Discoverer of Legal Science conceived them, not as you were
playing with them in your critical theory. And the law reviews were also
divided, because many of your colleagues, although fascinated by your writings,
continued to do the boring doctrinal work. Sooner or later everything went back
to normal, and the pages of the law reviews again reflected the discourse of the
classroom.
·
You are not guilty. But you are also not innocent. (I just can't stop being
spiteful.) The critical wave of the 1980s that you still like so much failed to
wash over those of your colleagues who were training the very scholars now
producing all of this mediocrity. Your twinned schizophrenia-the scholarly self
so different from other scholars but also so different from your classroom
persona-has "come home to roost. " 29 That great critical scholarship left
everyone high and dry, maybe because it denied the very idea of justice and so
in its own way gave the professors more of the same stuff they'd been getting
since Holmes.
Still, you are a fine fellow. After all, your essay-assisted perhaps by my
underground moaning-pleads for breadth of vision in law. It's just that you
assume away the most fertile path to the wide horizon you seek, to the waves of
energy you seem to find now only in your nostalgia. "You guys reeeeeeaaaaaaaaally missed it," 30 you say: But did we? Or did you, with your extended
analysis of the impoverishment of judicial prose, 31 miss it for us?

26. ANDRE SCHWARZ-BART, THE LAST OF THE JusT (Stephen Becker trans., 1961).
27. Schlag, supra note 3, at 806 n.9.
28. Id. at -806.
29. The Reverend Jeremiah Wright, most recently.
30. I'm not sure I got all those repetitive vowels you used in your first four paragraphs completely
right, and no one's been demoted to check for me, so this will have to do.
31. Schlag, supra note 3, at Part II.
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SEE DANIEL AS AN ORPHAN

You are to me as the Rosenberg children's prosecutors were to them. 32 You
orphaned me, orphaned us, really, orphaned all of the children born to a certain
ideal, however flawed. You and your colleagues made sure that whatever
reformist. ideas we brought with us into Law School would be quashed completely by the end of the first week of studies. So from my underground perch
here, I am not surprised to find you writing about judges but offering nothing in
your article about justice. Small wonder that a guy like you who gets to teach ·
law-"one of the last truly great jobs on earth"33-feels uncomfortable talking
about justice: you don't get the grades in Law School needed to lead the
comfortable professorial life of "high-end mediocrity"34 by ·ruminating about
justice, now, do you? Many a wave propelled by justice has broken over your
professional beach-head and then been forgotten, while the ocean of justiceantipathy just keeps rolling along.
·
The closest you come to the idea of justice35-even in these complaints of
yours-is Robert Cover. 36 But you don't "get" Robert Cover. Yes, he was into
judges as ''jurispathic actors." 37 Judges do destroy as they make law. They
destroy other narratives as they elevate their own. They can also destroy people.
Cover knew that. But he was also obsessed, until the day he died, 38 with the
affirmative idea of justice. He liked to read stories, to read Midrash and
Melville, to ponder Dostoevsky-and he had the idea that judges can actually
do justice and that the stories they tell do not have to be destructive, do not have
to be violent. The Crits didn't want to see that part of Robert Cover.
So like most people who knew him, you miss Cover in two senses, and that's
par for the course. The Yale Law School didn't get Prof. Cover, either. When
they memorialized him formally a few months after his death, the only mention
of his interest in stories was an ironic (if truthful) anecdote about Bob saying he
never read an English novel he liked. 39 (But this of course was an exception to
his immersion in stories. Bob just didn't go for Dickens and the Victorian
novelists.) Stories lead us to an affirmative idea of justice. Cover linked stories
32. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
33. Schlag, supra note 3, at 806.
34. Id. at 828.
35. Maybe I missed something-though I'm pretty careful-but your actual use of the word seems
to be a sort of put-down: "Judges work with and within a discourse that has for centuries subordinated
truth and edification ... to the dispensation of justice . ... " Id. at 816.
36. Id. at 816--17.
37. Id.
38. Personal account of Richard Weisberg, who spent the afternoon with him in New Haven on July
17, 1986, the day before he died. Among other stories discussed that afternoon, Billy Budd, Sailor and
The Brothers Karamazov (as they often had in their conversations) took pride of place. Cover loved
those stories and was haunted by the judicial errors in both. However, these two late-nineteenth century
narratives did not strike him as signaling the inevitability of injustice but-on the contrary-;-the
possibility of jus_t outcomes where just judges preside. See generally Milner Ball et al., 8 CARDOZO
Snm. L. & LITERATI/RE i, i-252 (1996) (a commemorative volume for Robert M. Cover).
39. Owen Fiss, Remarks in New Haven, Conn. (Sept. 14, 1986) (personal recollection of author).
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to law; of course. The combination had its wave, as you mention, 40 and he rode
it magnificently.41 It broke-also in two senses-upon the idea of justice.
For you, legal academic discourse fatally tracks the discourse of judges, and
"Li]udicial discourse is not intellectually edifying. It is not designed to be. Quite
the contrary: judicial discourse is in many · ways intellectually arrested and
arresting.',4 2 Talk about circularity! Your syllogism about the law reviews
proves your point, I guess, at least once you posit, as you do repetitively, 43 the
universality of banal judicial speech. Yes, you hedge on this: "in many ways"
just above might mean that in some other ways judges do speak edifyingly and
truthfully. And your chronology seems to imply (as Cover would have emphasized) that in a time even before The Endless Summer, 44 judges did justice
through their words and deeds; Solomon comes to mind, especially because
Daniel has been thinking -biblically since I got my name under yours. So several
things follow: first, judicial discourse, if it indeed controls academic discourse
in all periods besides the ones I "reaaaaaaHy [sic] missed," might still be
edifying and truthful instead of banal; and second, academic .discourse would
then itself be interesting instead of mediocre. Or, to avoid the circularity of the
reasoning altogether, academic discourse might collaborate with judicial discourse, encourage it, for example, less to embrace (say) indeterminacy or
micro-economic theory than to re-engage the idea of justice itself.
Before you orphaned me, I thought law professors would guide me towards
some notion or another of justice. This fatuous idea in part came from those
"popular understandings" you so deride. 45 Most folks interested in medicine
want to cure people. Most folks interested in the law want to do justice. (You' re
right; they also might want to make money in the process or from time to time.)
My upbringing inspired me to think our legal system would do more than create
the unholy mess it is in now, a system currently uninterested in economic
disparities, outsiders, history, the Constitution,46 etc.
In the beginning there was. light. Even in law school, I fo'!lnd ties to my
umbilical cord while you and your colleagues were busy severing it, busy
launching me to float free in the "real world" where justice has no place. The
sources of these connections to my true self were the very judges you deride!
(Thankfully, you did not make me read your articles until I went underground as
a second-year law review member, destined as clerk and perhaps professor for
the very void you now bemoan.) I asked a friend of mine in Torts to pursue the
40. See Schlag, supra note 3, at 821.
41. See, e.g. , ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: Alm-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975)
(preface on Antigone and Billy Budd); Robert M. Covet, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of
the Wont, the Deed, and the Role, 20 GA. L. REv. 815 (1986). See generally B'all et al., supra note 38.
42. Schlag, supra note 3, at 813.
43. The exact same, unproven thought ends id.
44. Id. at 804 & n.l.
45. Id. at 814-15.
46. Okay, there are many exceptions. My current favorite is Judge Sterling Johnson's opinion in
Bodnerv. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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thought experiment that Benjamin N. Cardozo's opinions be made the exclusive
curriculum for a first year course on "Justice." She did not readily agree-we
had already been taught not readily to agree to anything-but she sent me to
Cardozo' s essays and opined that such a course should also include them.
In the 1920s and 1930s, it seems, Benjamin N. Cardozo looked to academicians and their writings because, like him, they were interested in justice. You
want to be nostalgic for the 1980s? My colleague got me up to speed with the
1920s! Consider this passage from one of Benjamin N.'s essays:
Justice in this sense is a concept by far more subtle and indefinite than any
that is yielded by mere [Daniel loves that "mere"!] obedience to a rule. It
remains to some extent, when all is said and done, the synonym of an
aspiration, a mood of exaltation, a yearning for what is fine and high.
"Justice," says Stammler in a recent paper, "is the directing of a particular
legal volition according to the conception of a pure community."47
Okay, okay, it's a bit vague-I guess you would call it indeterminate! But
why shouldn't our teachers insist we try to make sense of that kind of indeterminacy when every other vague area of the law is thrown at us constantly? Why
not justice itself? Justice is the big kahuna! So in Hynes v. New York Central
Railroad,48 he built upon ideas of law expressed in the academy to find the just
answer where "dryly logical" legal rules had previously rejected the plaintiff's
claim: "This case is a striking instance of the dangers of 'a jurisprudence of
conceptions,' the extension of a maxim or a definition with relentless disregard
of consequences to 'a dryly logical extreme.' The approximate and relative
become the definite and absolute.',49
Thus did the highest court in New York find its way to justice through legal
scholarship. (Cardozo and the academic writers in those days also saw the
effective use of the English language as integral to the doing-and the analysis-of justice.) Relegated to its own "underground" were the courts below,
which had predicated their erroneous dismissal on a standing doctrinal conclusion that trespassers, like "the lad of 16" in this case, were owed no duty of care
by landowner defendants, even where the negligence occurred "on public
waters in the exercise of public rights." 50
Your complaint fal~ely assumes that judicial prose is unedifying, so academic
discourse falls flat as well. But even if your assumption is correct, the tail need
not wag the dog. Judges and academicians have synergized in eras not so
47. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWIB OF THE LAW 87 (1924).
48. Hynes v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921). Discussion of this case enlivened academic

discourse during the heyday of your much-regretted bygone epoch, from Richard Weisberg, Law,
Literature, and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, l CARDOZO L. REv. 283, 324-26 (1979), to RICHARD PosNER,
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 48 passim (1990).
49. Hynes, 131 N.E. at 900 (citing Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 605,
605, 608, 610 (1908)) (internal citation omitted).
50. Id. at 900.
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removed from our own. Sometimes Cardozo looked to the law reviews for a
rule of law; often he looked beyond them as well:
Now, personally I prefer to give the label law to a much larger assembly 'o f social
facts than would have that label affixed to them by many of the neo-realists. I find
lying around loose, and ready to be embodied into a judgment according to some
process of selection to be practiced by a judge, a vast conglomeration of principles
and customs and usages and moralities. If these are so established as to justify a
prediction, with reasonable certainty that they will have the backing of the courts in
the event that their authority is challenged, I say that they are law. 51

I SAY TIIAT THEY ARE LAW. This privileg(}-in a far more modest form-I
wanted for myself when I entered law school: a small piece of the pie, a chance to add
to what was there, to improve the mix, to refine the recipe for justice. I wouldn't have
cared if your lesson to me after awhile was that I would be no Cardozo. Or even that
you thought there were better ingredients than those he provided. Instead, the pie
disappeared under your tutelage. That was a decision you all made. Even when the
big wave, as you see it, was there for the finding.
You-even you!-foreclose my potential to contribute to the betterment of
law, to find "according to some process of selection"52 you could have taught to
me the pathway to justice. And you-especially you!-willfully orphaned me
from what I was by assuming (without real proof) that "[j]udicial discourse is
not intellectually edifying."53 That judges deflect whatever tendency they may
have towards "truth" or ''edification" into "the end of reaching a decision, a
holding, an order and decree." 54
Give us our year-long course on Cardozo. Then let me decide: (a) what justice is or
might be; (b) whether judicial discourse lacks interest in it or thinks of it in the
reductionist way you describe in your sole use of the word 'justice";55 or (c) what
kind of academic discourse I might envision if-having successfully descended to the
Law Review underground-I make the fraught decision to follow you upwards, ever
upwards, "in search of the perfect wave."56

V.

CONCLUSION

Resentment and justice are diametrically opposed. 57

51. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Address Before the New York State Bar Association Meeting (Jan. 22,
1932), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATIIAN CARDOZO: THE CHOICE OF TvCHo BRAHE 7, 18
(Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
52. Id.
53. Schlag, supra note 3, at 813.
54. Id. at 816.
55. See supra, note 35.
56. Schlag, supra note 3, at 804.
57. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On the Genealogy of Morals, in ON TIIB GENEALOGY OF MORALS & EcCE
· HoMo 13, 73-76 (Walter·Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1967) (1887).

